Clinical review: SARS – lessons in disaster management by Hawryluck, Laura et al.
384 ICU = intensive care unit; SARS = severe acute respiratory syndrome.
Critical Care    August 2005 Vol 9 No 4 Hawryluck et al.
Abstract
Disaster management plans have traditionally been required to
manage major traumatic events that create a large number of
victims. Infectious diseases, whether they be natural (e.g. SARS
[severe acute respiratory syndrome] and influenza) or the result of
bioterrorism, have the potential to create a large influx of critically ill
into our already strained hospital systems. With proper planning,
hospitals, health care workers and our health care systems can be
better prepared to deal with such an eventuality. This review
explores the Toronto critical care experience of coping in the
SARS outbreak disaster. Our health care system and, in particular,
our critical care system were unprepared for this event, and as a
result the impact that SARS had was worse than it could have
been. Nonetheless, we were able to organize a response rapidly
during the outbreak. By describing our successes and failures, we
hope to help others to learn and avoid the problems we
encountered as they develop their own disaster management plans
in anticipation of similar future situations.
Introduction
The Commission recognizes the skill and dedication
of so many individuals in the Ontario public health
system and those volunteers from Ontario and
elsewhere who worked beyond the call of duty …
They faced enormous workloads and pressures in
their tireless fight, in a rapidly changing environment,
against a deadly mysterious disease. The strength of
Ontario’s response lay in the work of the people who
stepped up and fought SARS. What went right in a
system where so much went wrong, is their
dedication …  [1]
Disaster management plans have traditionally been required
to manage major traumatic events that create a large number
of victims. Infectious diseases, whether they be natural or the
result of bioterrorism, have the potential to create a large
influx of critically ill patients, and disaster management
planning should take such eventualities into account. This
need was demonstrated in February 2003, when a new
illness – SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) – spread
from the People’s Republic of China to 28 countries,
resulting in 8096 probable cases with 774 deaths [2]. This
review explores the Toronto critical care experience of coping
in a disaster outbreak situation. By sharing our experiences
and our coping strategies, we hope that others will learn from
our successes and avoid the problems we encountered,
many of which were a direct result of lack of preparedness.
We hope that this review will encourage others to make plans
to cope with similar outbreaks in the future, should they
occur.
The diagnosis of SARS relies on a high index of clinical
suspicion because there is no early, reliable and readily
available diagnostic test for the responsible virus (SARS-
CoV) [3–6]. Likewise, it is expected that other emerging
infectious agents will pose diagnostic challenges. Because of
this, as infected individuals present to medical institutions
where staff are unprepared, the risk for spread is
considerable. An outbreak situation may arise quickly and
without much warning, taxing the resources of any health care
system and the ability of its personnel to cope. The most
fundamental guidance we offer is that you need to have a
plan in advance. Since 11 September 2001, the USA and
other countries have run exercises to prepare for attacks,
including bioterrorism [7–12]. We believe that, based on the
way in which SARS crippled our health care system (in
particular critical care delivery) and dealt significant blows to
our economy, a great deal could be gained from simulating
similar events and planning a system wide response to
emerging pathogens.
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The development of a disaster management plan in the event
of emerging diseases poses very unique challenges, and we
offer some insights into these below.
Disaster plan development: leadership and
organizational issues
Core to any disaster management plan are leaders with clear
responsibilities to coordinate efforts and develop policies to
contain the disease; to coordinate resource allocation and
manpower; to advise and share information regarding
infection control and treatment; to share data and research
endeavours; to maintain staff morale; and to provide
information to various levels of government, health care
institutions, front-line workers and the public [1,13]. The
model we propose (Fig. 1) is one of a Central Critical Care
Crisis Team, composed of leaders of different subteams of
multidisciplinary professionals responsible for domains of
crucial importance: clinical management, infection control,
education, communication, team morale, manpower and
system thinking, data collection, research and, finally,
lobbying to ensure resources are available to meet critical
care needs. Appointed leaders should have the capacity to
gather quickly a team of professionals to help address issues
within their domains. Team membership is not a competition
or a measure of professional worth. Rather, consideration
must be given to who can best fulfill the roles. The role of the
Central Critical Care Crisis Team is to coordinate the efforts
of the various leaders, to avoid duplication of efforts and,
through regular sharing of information, problems and support,
to work together to devise creative solutions and anticipate
future needs. Concerted efforts to address cross-institutional
problems can be addressed in these forums.
Infection control
Any jurisdiction dealing with an outbreak of a new infectious
disease must ensure that it has the means to communicate
clearly and quickly, as well as receive information, on the
following: updated diagnostic criteria; suspected and
established epidemiological links; numbers of infected
patients as well as those quarantined and at risk; prognosis
and treatment issues; current knowledge regarding the most
effective means of infection control; and infection control
issues specific to different settings [1,13].
Any disaster plan must anticipate needs for infection control
equipment [11,14]. The SARS outbreak and the ongoing risk
for other emerging infections emphasize the importance of
having some basic stock [14], and creating a list of potential
suppliers who could rapidly increase their supply is advisable.
Requirements may be enormous; one Toronto hospital used
18,000 N95 masks and 14,000 pairs of gloves daily during
the SARS outbreak [15].
The importance of infection control measures, and of the
development of clear protocols and training cannot be over-
emphasized [14]. In Toronto one of the greatest challenges
that arose was handling the uncertainty of exactly what level
of precautions were needed to ensure staff safety. This was
an issue that had to be addressed immediately because
getting appropriate staff to work required that they felt as
protected as possible. Anecdotally, we found in some centres
that distrust occasionally emerged between front-line health
care workers and leadership. This may have been due to
several issues, including the following: there was no clear
system-wide communication strategy, and as a result rumours
and speculation frequently went unchecked; infection control
and other recommendations changed frequently, leading
many individuals to question the validity of previous
directives; and confusion over whether the responsible virus
could be airborne and variable use of airborne versus droplet
protection. Of note, subsequent evidence suggests that
airborne transmission may in fact be possible [16]. In
retrospect, we believe a city-wide, consistent and regular
communication strategy (which occurred in some institutions)
that acknowledged the fact that leadership was making
decisions in the face of uncertainty would have minimized the
distrust.
Surveillance
Unlike traditional notions of disaster (e.g. bombings), disaster
situations from infectious disease outbreaks do not have a
clear beginning or end. Disaster planning for these
circumstances is unique in that it challenges us to develop
practical means to conduct ongoing, widespread surveillance
and screening [1,11,13], particularly in light of unclear
prodromes and illness presentations and in the absence of
diagnostic testing. There is a need to develop a team to track
and follow potential epidemiological linkages quickly and to
engage in surveillance for de novo cases. This team will
Figure 1
Infectious disease outbreak disaster plan.386
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potentially have to collaborate across wide geographical
regions, engage in open discussion of uncertainty, and develop
a surveillance and quarantine strategy that is practical, as
comprehensive as possible and does not needlessly isolate
individuals and restrict their freedoms. In the face of uncertain
diagnostic criteria, it is important to acknowledge that some
individuals will be isolated needlessly and some infected
asymptomatic individuals will be missed, leading to new cases
with the potential to perpetuate the outbreak. It is important
that the surveillance team does not seek to assign blame under
these circumstances; instead, an analysis of each ‘failed’
surveillance or error should be undertaken to improve overall
knowledge of disease transmission and presentation, and to
prevent other infected individuals from falling through the
cracks. From the critical care point of view, it is important that
there is a feedback loop from these surveillance teams to the
critical care leadership, so that that subsequent reliable
communication and preparation can be assured.
Communication issues
Front-line workers
Any information regarding the transmission of disease to staff,
an analysis of how such spread may have occurred and
advice regarding future preventative measures should be
made available to everyone. In the present era of global travel,
it is increasingly unlikely that one centre or one country will be
dealing with new emerging diseases in isolation. Disaster
planners are challenged to develop a global perspective,
including accurate communication of events as they unfold in
distant jurisdictions. As a result, links to colleagues locally,
nationally and internationally are vital in a disaster situation.
Websites providing the most up-to-date information regarding
the outbreak, modes of transmission, clinical presentation and
required infection control measures can ensure speedy
communication to large numbers of people. In addition, such
websites can be used to teach how to don protective gear,
discuss and outline treatment strategies, teach how to respond
to unique crisis situations (e.g. cardiac arrests while
maintaining infection control measures), and serve as a way to
train treatment teams at different hospital sites. Indeed,
internet-based technology proved invaluable during the SARS
outbreak in Toronto by allowing our experiences and our newly,
on occasion painfully, gained knowledge to be shared with
other affected centres and countries. Colleagues in unaffected
countries were warned and prepared (for example, see SARS
resources [17]). The establishment of such systems for
communicating and sharing information, resources, data and
research endeavours is one of the clear successes in the
management of SARS. Efforts to establish such links should be
made in all future outbreak situations [18].
Patients and families
Those affected by SARS were scared. We were unable to
provide them with much information; they were isolated and
prognosis was very uncertain. Affected patients must be kept
as informed as possible. Family members who had had any
contact with the patient were placed in strict quarantine, and as
a result they were not allowed to visit, even if a loved one was
dying. Any disaster management plan must anticipate the
isolation and need for informational, psychological and
emotional support for those immediately affected, including
loved ones. The Toronto experience suggests that there is a
need to develop more effective means to convey information on
quarantine and infection control and to provide support [19].
Media and public
In Toronto, the SARS outbreak received unprecedented
media attention. Daily headlines generated widespread fear
and panic. Efforts to decrease sensationalism, to portray an
honest picture, and to elicit the help and understanding of the
public were lessons that can be learned for any disaster
management plan [20,21]. Assigning one team of
professionals, as outlined in Fig. 1, to inform and update the
media would ensure that consistent information is provided,
and would avoid the confusion, fear, anxiety and even chaos
that can potentially arise (frequently resulting from inaccurate
information) if left unchecked.
Education
Educating teams on how to treat infected individuals, mount
surveillance for others, observe infection control measures,
respond to emergency situations, collect data and conduct
research, and support each other is vital. The education team
would be responsible for the creation of educational
packages that could be disseminated across many
institutions. In addition, mobile educational teams can be
deployed to individual institutions to meet specific needs. By
developing and ensuring consistent standards of infection
control across institutions, these teams not only will help to
decrease the transmission of disease and avoid prolongation
of the outbreak, but also will serve to support staff morale by
helping them to develop means to overcome any
environmental barriers to infection control, sharing
experiences and emphasizing the fact that everyone faces
similar challenges and is working together.
When the outbreak is controlled, educational efforts are not
over. The team responsible for education must also be prepared
to analyze its performance and devise ways to improve. In
addition, ongoing training exercises, potentially using simulators
and mock outbreak/disaster exercises, must be instituted to
ensure that knowledge gained is not lost and that front-line
workers are prepared for the next time, because this next time
may arise with little or no warning. Finally, the SARS outbreak
also helped us to identify another educational need by our
intensive care unit (ICU) fellowship trainees – the need to
provide them with practical hands-on experience in leadership.
Team morale/manpower
During the SARS outbreak health care providers felt isolated
[22,23]. Many front-line workers curtailed interactions with387
their families and friends for fear of transmitting the disease
[22]. Others were treated as pariahs. Front-line workers were
required to manage a level of critical illness that they might
not usually have managed [23,24]. Infection control measures
were burdensome and difficult to bear. Despair and
depression became common [23,24].
Regular communication via teleconferences and e-mails
became the new means to provide support. These provided a
forum to dispel rumours, clarify media reports, synthesize the
barrage of government directives, and support those feeling
isolated as we sought to work in extremely difficult and
demanding conditions, such as seeing our colleagues placed
in quarantine after exposure, some of them falling ill,
becoming critically ill and even succumbing to SARS.
Staff morale was addressed in some institutions by
encouraging and commending health care workers, and
congratulating them, whether for their efforts to treat patients,
collect data, communicate with other centres and share
information, improve infection control measures or teach
others, or for simply surviving the day and/or night. Some
hospitals instituted regular group support meetings and
debriefing with the help of psychiatric or emergency
response crisis teams.
The most effective way to provide support is not currently
known. Particular attention to devising ways to decrease
isolation and the emotional and psychological burdens should
be an integral part of any disaster management plan. During
an outbreak, providing support does not necessarily require a
complicated plan. Providing meals or refreshments to staff
working in cumbersome, hot and heavy protective gear, and
providing safe areas to relax in are simple, easy and well
appreciated means to convey support. The presence of
leaders who are prepared to risk their own health alongside
front-line staff, who listen to staff concerns and address them
to the best of their ability, and who discuss and/or reiterate
management plans is another straightforward means to
provide much needed support and a boost to staff morale. It
is important that leadership demonstrate willingness to
participate in the front-line environment. Finally, consideration
of the need for management of post-traumatic stress
disorder, in consultation with psychiatric colleagues, is
prudent, and such investment is likely to prevent some of the
long-term disability we have seen.
Any future similar situations will also pose challenges to
professionalism. As seen with SARS [22] and the emergence
of HIV [25–27], most health care providers never anticipated
being in a situation that put their personal safety, health and
potentially their lives and those of their families on the line.
Questions arose regarding whether there is a duty to care
and how much personal risk should be expected [22]. Some
refused to care for SARS patients, and some refused to even
enter wards containing SARS patients [22]. Others
demanded ‘danger pay’ and compensation for illness and
quarantine. Understandably, some worried about the extent of
their disability and life insurance coverage. These views
raised further challenges, fracturing the front-line teams who
found themselves asking what, if anything, made their
colleagues’ lives more ‘valuable’ than their own. Issues of
duty to care and of balancing personal risk and professional
obligations remain for a large part unanswered. Further
research and debate is required. Disaster planning must,
however, consider whether such issues are likely to arise and
include potential strategies to deal with them. Consideration
should be given to developing means to decrease the anxiety
regarding transmission of illness to family members; these
could include child care and arranging the provision of
alternate living quarters for staff, among others.
Intensive care unit resource management: manpower
and beds
During the SARS outbreak, the supply of critical care beds
became a significant concern because of the need to manage
a surge of unanticipated critically ill patients. This was a big
problem because our occupancy rates were already
unacceptably high. This supply issue will become a crucial
concern in any future outbreak or disaster situation. In addition
to our problem with bed availability, the human resources
component further exacerbated the problem; the staff
numbers were reduced by fear of contracting the disease,
quarantine and illness. When SARS transmission occurred in
ICUs, entire units were quarantined for 12–14 days. Of tertiary
care university medical/surgical ICU beds and community ICU
beds in Toronto, 38% and 33%, respectively, were closed at
some point [28]. Maintaining provision of ICU services to non-
SARS patients became an important consideration as the
outbreak progressed. In anticipation of future outbreaks, plans
to organize critical care resources to meet the needs of all
critically ill patients should be developed. For example, critical
care beds can be rapidly augmented by other areas of the
hospital that are adequately equipped (e.g. recovery rooms,
operating rooms, emergency rooms, etc.).
Institutions do need to develop their own individual plans
based on their available resources, and must share the
models/strategies that they institute so that others can learn
and potentially adapt these plans to their own centres.
However, one of the most important roles played by the
Central Critical Care Crisis Team is to help create more ICU
resources, rapidly. The scope of future outbreaks or disasters
will always be uncertain, but, potentially, critical care
providers will need to be able to care for many, many more
patients very quickly. Because most ICUs currently function
at very high occupancy rates, absorbing such additional
numbers is unimaginable. Meeting these needs clearly
requires us to move from institution-based to system-based
thinking. In addition, critical care providers must be prepared
to make tough decisions regarding triage and standards of
care. Critical care providers should pre-develop engineering
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plans to isolate wards, rather than those that were developed
by necessity on-the-fly in Toronto.
From silos to system-based thinking
The creation of such a system-based disaster management
plan is not an easy task. Sharing information and learning
from collective experience requires unprecedented collabora-
tion and open communication between all levels of
government, health care organizations and front-line workers.
There is no room for political barriers, institution-based
thinking (as opposed to system-wide thinking), bickering over
responsibilities, or consideration of personal professional
gain [1,13]. System-wide thinking may challenge even the
most seasoned of critical care providers because the scope
of current barriers, the number of people involved and the
effort needed to get them to collaborate on such a broad
scale is not something that they will necessarily have
experienced or tried to tackle in the past.
These systems versus institutional issues are common in any
health care system; in Toronto they worsened the impact of
SARS, and in the early days of the outbreak they diminished
much needed communication and collaboration [1,13]. We
also observed that in many hospitals there was duplication of
some efforts, wasting precious resources [1,13] at a time
when, after many years of cutbacks and strain, we did not
have resources to waste. Events such as SARS challenge all
of us to review the organizational structure of our health care
systems and correct potential problems that may arise in
similar situations [1,13]. Consideration should be given to
designating specific hospitals as main centres for screening
suspected cases and treating those affected; identifying
hospitals to meet general and those to meet more specialized
care needs of other critically ill patients; devising means to
increase critical care resources within the affected region;
and identifying institutions to decant certain patients to (e.g.
alternate level of care patients) and to provide for specific
ongoing needs of the population (e.g. cardiac services).
Although the designation of outbreak hospitals does place a
greater toll on front-line workers in these institutions, those
health care providers caring for greater numbers of SARS
patients in Toronto actually experienced less anxiety in the
form of post-traumatic stress disorder symptomatology [29].
Such measures may also result in faster disease containment
(by decreasing breaches in infection control) and better
patient care as the teams become more familiar with the
disease. Unlike the Toronto experience, in which SARS
hospitals were designated late in the outbreak, SARS
hospitals in other countries experienced little to no
transmission to staff [30]. In Toronto, entire ICUs were
quarantined as a result of transmission of SARS to staff [28].
Subsequently, provision of critical care to both SARS patients
and all other critically ill patients was jeopardized. Although
designation of outbreak hospitals seems a simple solution, it is
not as easy as it appears. For example, finding staff willing to
work in such a setting is a challenge. In addition, such a plan
does not preclude other hospitals from knowing how to deal
with the illness because, for the most part, the diagnosis is not
clear for several days and originating hospitals will need to be
prepared to manage patients until that point. Furthermore,
designated hospitals will need access to other medical
services as affected individuals develop other complications.
Finally, the act of transporting such contagious individuals is
not without considerable risk, and hence transportation
requires careful planning. We recommend that regions
develop and, importantly, test plans for working as a system
during a disaster like this.
Lobbying
Intensivists played a vital role during the SARS outbreak. The
ICU saw the greatest mortality and had to deal with high-risk
situations that increased the risk for contracting the disease
[14,28,30]. Infection control and issues specific to ICU care
and resource allocation meant that having a voice was vital.
Such lobbying for ICU resources must be started now. The
SARS outbreak has taught us that we can no longer accept,
without comment or objection, the present need to cope and
function, day in and day out, in a situation of inadequate
critical care resources and manpower. The importance of
having all levels of government understand what critical care
is, what our needs are, and the help we require to serve our
patients now and in the future is perhaps the most valuable
lesson of all that we offer to our readers – one that we
learned the hard way from surviving the SARS outbreak.
Conclusion
SARS emphasized the need for disaster management plans
to include new emerging infectious diseases. As our
knowledge of SARS-CoV grows, our strategies for diagnosis,
treatment and containment will improve. New infectious
diseases and/or possibly bioterrorism will take the place of
SARS-CoV and will similarly challenge us. Training our staff
and our future ICU trainees for such eventualities, through the
use of simulators and mock disaster codes, has become
necessary to build on our successes and learn from our past
to avoid the problems we encountered during SARS.
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